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1. Introduction 
In the last ten years forecast oriented monetary policy strategies became increasingly 
important. Most central banks now base current monetary policy implicitely or explicitly on a 
forecast of inflation and other key macroeconomic variables and in this way take into account 
the lags in the effects of monetary policy. This procedure is made very explicit by the 
inflation targeting strategy pioneered by the Bank of England, which aims at an inflation with 
a horizon one to two years. The same applies to the new monetary policy framework of the 
Swiss National Bank (SNB) adopted at the end of 1999. This framework replaced a money 
stock growth target by an inflation forecast over the next three years as the main indicator to 
guide monetary policy decisions. Besides the expected future inflation development, the 
medium term output growth forecast plays an important role. No central bank would hit its 
inflation target or keep medium term inflation in the stability range when this leads to a large 
deterioration of output growth performance. The trade-off between inflation and output 
growth is mostly analyzed by using Taylor rules in DSGE models or traditional 
macroeconometric models. This paper proposes an alternative approach that allows the 
analysis of forward-looking monetary policy in structural VARs, which are an often used tool 
to estimate the dynamic effects of monetary policy. First, an approach for modeling a 
monetary policy which aims at a strict medium term inflation or output growth target is 
developed. Second, the ex ante inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off for a forward-
looking policy aiming at a convex combination of these strategies is derived. Finally, an 
illustration of our approach is given using Swiss data.  
2. A SVAR Analysis of Monetary Policy 
In this section, we develop a method for the analysis of monetary policy in a SVAR 
framework. We proceed on the assumption that the VAR model includes a vector of quarterly 
changes in log output, short term interest rate, log real money stock and log price level: 
)log),/log(,,log(' tttttt ppmryX ∆∆∆∆= . This framework assuming I(1) level series  
and no cointegration is the specification  we adopted in our empirical illustration, but many 
other models differing with respect to number of variables and order of integration are 
possible. There are only two restrictions which are fundamentally necessary in our 
framework: first inflation and GDP-growth have to be included in the model and these 
variables should be stationary. Second, the VAR model has to be specified in a way that 
allows the identification of a monetary policy shock. The number of other variables included 
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and their integration and cointegration properties as well the nature of the short and or long 
run restrictions adopted is only important for the way the impulse response coefficients used 
in the following exercise are estimated. In our empirical applications we used long-run 
neutrality restrictions in order to identify structural shocks with variances normalized to 1 for 
the VAR defined above but other identification schemes could be applied as well. In our 
application we get impulse responses for three non-monetary policy shocks  and 
the monetary policy shock . The former shocks can be interpreted as aggregate supply 
shock, IS shock and money demand shock, respectively. However, this interpretation is not 
essential, as only the joint effect of these three shocks on future inflation and output growth is 
needed with our approach. 
ttt uuu 3211 ,,
tu4
   Alternative strategies for monetary policy can now be analyzed by deriving 
conditional forecasts from the SVAR model. Specifically, we determine a sequence of policy 
shocks required to satisfy such conditions as an average inflation or output growth target over 
a two- or three-year period. Now consider a monetary policy strategy based on an average 
inflation forecast for the next K quarters. Take a monetary policy reacting symmetrically to 
positive and negative deviations from the inflation target *π  measured at a quarterly rate. For 
such a monetary policy, we get conditional forecasts in the following way: First, we define the 
expected deviation, as of time t, of the average inflation from its target for horizon K 
   ,               (1) )loglog(*),( tKttp ppEKtKd −−= +π
Next, we have to determine the sequence of monetary shocks from t+1 to t+K that 
leads to an expected average inflation which is equal to the target *π . There is an infinite 
number of ways to calculate these shocks. Leeper and Zha (1999) show that policy shocks in 
VAR-models have to be modest and least disturbing in order not to violate the validity of the 
simulations. We therefore minimize the sum of the squared shocks subject to the restriction so 
that the average inflation rate is on target:  
                              (2) ∑∑
=
+
=
+ =−−→
K
i
pit
K
i
it tKduiKAAtsu
1
444
1
2
4 0),()(..min
AA (j) is the 4x4 matrix of the impulse response, cumulated over j periods. Thus, the element 
4,4 of this matrix gives the j period cumulated response of inflation to a monetary shock. The 
solution of this minimization problem is obtained as 
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Of course, we can apply the same approach using the average output growth as a target 
of monetary policy. Assume that the targeted output growth rate is denoted by γ *. Again we 
define first the deviation of the unconditional forecast of the output growth from target K 
periods ahead as  )loglog(*),( tKtty yyEKtKd −−= +γ  and obtain the following optimal (in 
the least squares sense) policy shocks for t+1 to t+K: 
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In what follows, we call a rule based exclusively on an inflation (output growth) target 
a strategy of strict medium-term inflation (output growth) targeting. Next, we consider the 
trade-off faced by monetary policy in the framework of our SVAR model. To this end, we 
consider the variability of inflation and output growth implied by different degrees of 
medium-term inflation and output growth targeting over the K-period horizon. To start with, 
we define a convex combination of the monetary policy shocks for strict medium-term 
inflation or output growth targeting derived in the last section: 
KitKdgtKdgu yyippiit ,,1),,()1(),(4 K=−+=+ αα       (5) 
This is the situation of a monetary policy board, where the decision is taken by 
consensus and according to the average preferences of its members. The board members have 
either the preference for pure inflation targeting or pure output growth targeting in the 
medium-term. The parameter α  thus reflects the fraction of the inflation hawks in the board 
and α−1  is the fraction of the inflation doves. This strategy corresponds to the goal of 
minimizing the weighted sum of the conditional variability of the expected medium term 
inflation and growth rate. 
The proposed formalization of the monetary policy strategy is appropriate in the sense 
that it captures very well the focus of medium term orientation of monetary policy on inflation 
and GDP growth perspectives we see in many countries. Indeed, our experience in particular 
with Switzerland tells us that the discussion about monetary policy exactly focuses on 
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medium term inflation and GDP growth outlooks and a main issue is how much a GDP 
growth target should be taken into account. However, our framework for monetary policy 
analysis differs from the two approaches usually adopted in the literature, namely the Taylor 
rule and the optimizing framework. It may be argued that our framework lies somehow 
between these two approaches. Equation (5) shares some features with the Taylor rule 
framework: it implies, for instance, a negative value for the monetary policy shock when the 
medium term inflation forecast and/or GDP growth forecast is above target which leads to an 
increase of the interest rate. The weights α and (1-α) play a similar role as the coefficients of 
the inflation and output gap term in a Taylor rule, respectively. By contrast to an ad hoc 
Taylor rule, the policy reaction in our framework aims at a medium-term target taking fully 
into account the expected dynamic effects according to a fully specified empirical model. This 
feature of our model is shared with the optimizing framework. However, the latter is more 
general in the sense that a discounted weighted average of all future expected inflation and 
output variability is taken into account. With our approach policy makers are more “simple 
minded” as they care only about conditional medium term inflation and GDP growth 
volatility. 
Another modeling issue is raised by the Lucas critique. Of course, our approach would 
be invalid if we consider changes in α as regime changes. We see “regime changes” as a 
fundamentally new orientation of the goals of monetary policy as the transition from an 
environment of high and volatile inflation to a policy of keeping inflation low as many 
countries experienced in the last 15 years. In our model inflation (and a fortiori growth) 
always returns to its long-run equilibrium irrespective of the value adopted for α and we 
consider such changes in α therefore as “modest” and non-fundamental.  
Now, let us see to what extent the planned sequence of monetary policy shocks is able 
to close the deviation of average inflation and output growth rate from their targets. The 
remaining gap  (measured as deviation from target) corresponds to the impact of the 
policy shocks minus the forecasted deviation from target  induced by the three non-
policy shocks at time t. These effects can be calculated using the corresponding cumulated 
impulse responses and equation (5) as well as the formulae for the shocks of the two strict 
targeting strategies given by equation (3) and (4), respectively: 
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For the economic interpretation of the two expressions derived above, we briefly 
consider the (expected) response of the inflation rate to the forecast-oriented monetary policy. 
If α  is equal to one (strict medium-term inflation targeting), we expect to hit the average 
inflation target exactly and the remaining gap  is zero. Otherwise, we expect the 
medium-term inflation rate to deviate from the target. This deviation is determined by the 
expression . The second term in the brackets reflects the influence of 
the reaction of monetary policy to the output growth target. Of course, the latter effect 
depends on the corresponding deviation from the output target  and the co-movement of 
output and prices in reaction to a monetary policy shock . In fact,  can be interpreted as 
the population regression coefficient of the (K-i)-period cumulated monetary policy response 
of inflation on the (K-i)-period cumulated monetary policy response of output growth. Thus, 
the size of the remaining gap due to not following a strict medium-term inflation targeting 
rule, depends on the sign and size of  as well as on the difference in sign and size between 
 and . The closer  is to 1 and the closer  is to , the 
smaller the remaining gap  will be. Of course, the interpretation for the remaining output 
growth gap corresponds exactly to that of the inflation gap.  
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The expected deviation of the K-period ahead log price and log output level from the 
target path is revised in period t according to the non-monetary policy shocks 
hitting the economy. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that we are in equilibrium in time 
 in the sense that we expect to hit both targets in the period t to 
ttt uuu 3211 ,,  
1−t 1−+ Kt . However, the 
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non-monetary policy shock of period t lead to deviations from the targets, which in turn needs 
a revision of the planned monetary policy shock sequence. We first note that the deviations of 
the unconditional forecasts from their targets are given by: 
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where we assume that the policy shock is equal to zero as of time t. Note that the non-
monetary policy shocks have an impact effect on prices and output which has to be subtracted 
as it has no influence on future inflation and growth. 
Substituting these expressions into the responses of the price and output levels to the 
policy shocks 
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and calculating conditional variances (given information of time t) provides the following 
expressions:  
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This implies a linear trade-off in the standard deviations of the output growth and 
inflation medium-term responses. Of course, this conditional variance is zero for inflation 
(output growth) when α is 1 (0), otherwise both variances are larger than zero. The reader has 
to be reminded that these conditional variances are with respect to the K-period ahead 
expected values in t. Finally, it should be mentioned that the approach outlined above is 
straightforwardly modified to a policy aiming at an inflation or growth rate for some future 
period j to K, i.e. from 5 to 8 quarters: We have simply to replace  by  in 
equations (8) and (9). 
)0(ilAA )(1 jAA l
 Before turning to our empirical application, we have briefly to address the question 
why we do not incorporate the policy reaction in the VAR coefficients as it is done with 
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structural models instead of focusing on the policy shocks. This alternative approach is, 
however, in general not feasible in our VAR framework. In order to demonstrate this let us 
assume for the sake of simplicity that the vector 
)log),/log(,,log(' tttttt ppmryX ∆∆∆∆=   follows a VAR(1) model and that policy 
reacts to the expected medium term inflation and growth rate according to a Taylor rule with 
idiosyncratic policy shock ξ: 
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The cross equations restriction implied by the Taylor rule for the VAR coefficients can be 
derived as follows:  Let us define the selection vectors for the interest rate, inflation and 
growth in the vector  X 
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Considering the time t expected value of the Taylor rule for period t+1 with the future 
expected values replaced by their VAR forecast we obtain 
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This implies the following  4 cross equations restrictions depending on the policy reaction 
parameter for the VAR coefficients 
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 If  the Taylor equations coefficients are known we can test the restrictions given by equation 
(17) and can get restricted estimates of the VAR coefficient matrix using the approaches 
developed for VAR models of  the term structure of interest rates1.  However, this does not 
help in our context as we should find a reparametrization of the VAR coefficients involving 
the Taylor equation coefficients. This means that we have to find solutions of (17) for 4 
                                                 
1 An outline of this approach can be found in Kugler (1990), for instance.  
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elements of the A-matrix depending on the remaining 12 elements of A as well as of 1γ  and 
2γ . Thus the parameters of our restricted VAR-model consists of 12 unrestricted VAR 
coefficients as well as 1γ  and 2γ . If this approach were possible we could estimate the model 
in this new form and then calculate the K-period forecasting variance decomposition for 
different values of  1γ  and 2γ  in order to show the trade-off between inflation and GDP-
growth variability. However,  the required reparametrization is not possible in general (except 
for K=1,2), as polynomials of order K in the A-coefficients are involved on the right-hand side 
of (17) and no explicit solution for 4 elements of the A-matrix is therefore available. 
 
3. An Application to Swiss Data  
This section provides an illustration of our approach using Swiss data. Switzerland is 
an interesting example for our approach as there was no fundamental regime change since the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973. We consider the change in the SNB's 
monetary policy strategy mentioned in the introduction as non-fundamental as price stability 
remained the ultimate objective of Swiss monetary policy throughout the sample period. 
Moreover, although the SNB adjusted its operating procedures at the end of 1999, this 
modification did not cause a break in the time series process of the variables considered in our 
SVAR model: The level of bank reserves, used as the main policy instrument before 1999, 
and the interest rate on repos, the principal new instrument, are not included in our VAR 
system. 
Figure 1 displays the impulse response estimate for a SVAR model for Switzerland 
corresponding to that used in Section 2, which is exactly identified by six long-run 
triangularity restrictions. The variable y is GDP in 1990 in Swiss francs, p denotes the 
consumer price index, m the money stock M1 and r the quarterly average of the three-month 
Swiss franc Libor rate of interest an the VAR lag-length is 5. In order to keep the model as 
lean as possible, the exchange rate is excluded from the vector , as the transmission of 
monetary policy via the exchange rate is indirectly captured by the impulse responses of the 
VAR model. Explicit inclusion of the exchange rate would be necessary if this variable had 
influenced SNB behavior in a systematic way and, therefore, were required to identify a 
monetary policy shock. Exchange rate considerations played no important role for the bulk of 
the sample period, the exception being in particular the years 1978/79. Note that we do not 
X
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select a monetary aggregate with a stable long-run money demand function in levels such as 
M3. We are only interested in a money stock concept providing a lot of information for the 
identification of a monetary policy shock. The monetary base was not used as the introduction 
of the electronic Swiss Interbank Clearing System and the relaxation of banks' liquidity 
requirements strongly distorted even the rates of change in this aggregate. However, we 
should also mention that the results are robust with respect to the in- or exclusion of the 
money stock series: a three variables VAR without money produces essentially the same 
shape of the impulse responses to the monetary policy shock as the four variable system. 
Finally, we ought to mention that the standard unit-root and co-integration tests support the 
first-difference specification adopted in this paper.2 More information on the application of 
SVAR models to Swiss data is provided by Kugler and Jordan (2004) and Kugler and Rich 
(2002).  
                                                 
2 The results with respect to the interest rate are ambiguous: we cannot reject the unit root hypothesis (ADF test) 
as well as the stationarity hypothesis (KPSS test). Thus, we proceed on the I(1) hypothesis which is more 
convenient in our framework for identification of a monetary policy shock. Of course, this implies that the real 
rate of interest rate is non-stationary what is clearly doubtful in the long-run. However, for the medium-term 
forecasting horizon considered in this paper this assumption is deemed acceptable.  
 9
Figure 1: Accumulated impulse responses of changes in log GDP, interest rate (3M-SFR- 
LIBOR), log real money stock (M1) and log prices (CPI) to structural shock, SVAR(5), 
quarterly data 1974/I-2002/IV 
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In the first column we find the responses of all variables (in the order they appear in 
the vector ) to the supply shock (Shock 1). Then, we have the responses to the IS-shock 
(Shock 2), to the money demand shock (Shock 3), and finally in the last column the response 
to the monetary policy shock (Shock 4), which is of most importance in the current context. 
First, there is evidence of a short-run negative liquidity effect on the interest rate extending 
over two quarters. The positive reaction in real GDP starts weakly and reaches its peak after 
five quarters and starts to peter out after another year. With respect to prices, it takes six 
quarters until a major positive effect is visible and 14 quarters are needed for full adjustment 
of prices. After about the fourth quarter, rising prices and inflation expectations cause the 
interest rate to overshoot temporarily its long-run equilibrium level.  
X
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Figure 2 shows the scatter diagram for the 8-period ahead inflation and output growth 
variance conditional on time t information obtained by using the impulse responses given in 
Figure 1. The 8-period time horizon is favorable to output growth targeting because the effect 
of a monetary shock on output is strong at this horizon whereas only half of the long-run 
effect on prices has occurred. We can see from Figure 2 that our SVAR model implies a 
standard convex efficiency frontier for the conditional variances of inflation and growth. The 
maximum variability of inflation is clearly higher than the maximum variability of output 
growth. This result is caused by the higher persistence of the impact of the shocks on inflation 
than on growth. It is interesting to compare the variances of the gaps achieved with an active 
monetary policy to a situation where monetary policy is not adopted to the time t structural 
shocks. Thus, the AS-shock, the IS-shock and the money demand shock influences medium-
term inflation and GDP-growth without any reaction of the central bank to them. In Figure 2, 
we see that this point is far above the efficient frontier which indicates the substantial benefits 
of an active monetary policy that reacts to new information. 
Figure 2: 8-quarters-ahead conditional variance of inflation and output growth trade-off 
Structural shocks (dashed line) as well as structural shocks with varying α and data revision errors 
(solid line), inflation and output growth measured in percent; alpha is the weight of medium term 
inflation target 
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 4. Conclusions 
In this paper we propose a new method to analyze forward-looking monetary policy in 
structural VAR’s based on the parameters of the impulse response function. To this end we 
develop first an approach for representing a monetary policy which aims at a strict medium-
term inflation or output growth target in a SVAR model. Second, we show how the ex ante 
inflation-output-growth volatility trade-off for a forward-looking policy aiming at a convex 
combination of a strict medium-term inflation and output growth targeting rule can be 
obtained in this framework. An illustration of this approach using Swiss data suggest that 
avoiding expected output growth variability has a high price in terms of expected inflation 
variability.  
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